The End of the Chevron Deference: Loper Bright Enterprises et al. v. Raimondo Secretary of Commerce et al.
On June 28, 2024, the United States Supreme Court overturned the decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, along with a forty-year-old precedent known as the “Chevron Deference.” This doctrine has previously mandated that courts defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statutes it oversees, even if the court, itself, interprets that statute differently.
Under the standard set forth in Chevron, when a court reviews how an agency interprets a statute, it considers two main questions. First, it checks whether Congress has clearly addressed the exact issued in question. Secondly, it looks at whether Congress has provided a clear intent that would settle the matter for both the court and the agency.
If Congress had not directly addressed the specific issue, then the court does not impose its own interpretation of the statute, which it would have done had there been no administrative interpretation. Instead, the court examines whether the statute is silent or ambiguous on the matter. In such cases, the key question of the court becomes whether the agency’s interpretation is a reasonable and permissive construction of the statute.
If the agency’s interpretation is deemed reasonable and permissible, the court cannot substitute its own interpretation. In sum, the court defers to the agency’s expertise in interpreting and applying the statute it administers, as long as the agency’s interpretation falls within the bounds of reasonableness.
The case of Loper Bright Enterprises et al. V. Raimondo Secretary of Commerce, et al. revolves around the legality of the federal regulation under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. Specifically, the case challenges a rule that requires commercial fishing vessels to pay for the costs associated with observer programs. These programs, which collect data on fish stocks and fishing practices, are crucial for managing and conserving fisheries.
Loper Bright Enterprises and other fishing businesses have argued that the regulation imposes an unfair financial burden and contend that the law does not authorize such a requirement and that it constitutes an overreach by the federal government.
On the other hand, the Secretary of Commerce and other officials have argued that the observer programs are necessary for ensuring sustainable fishing practices and that the costs are a legitimate aspect of managing those programs and defends the regulation asserting that it is valid exercise of the government’s authority to manage and conserve fishery resources under the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
The Supreme Court limited its review in Loper Bright as to whether Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. should be overruled or clarified and ruled that under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), courts must independently evaluate whether an agency has acted within its legal authority, rather than deferring to the agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statutes. This means that courts should apply their own judgment to determine the meaning of statutory provisions, rather than relying on the agency’s view.
The Court has reasoned that legal interpretation is and has been the province and duty of the judicial department for at least 221 years (Marbury v. Madison). Judges are expected to apply their judgment independent of the political branches when interpreting the laws that those branches enact. The APA bars judges from disregarding that responsibility because an Executive Branch agency views a statute differently. Courts need not, and under the APA may not, defer to an agency interpretation of a law simply because a statute is ambiguous, thus overruling Chevron.
Although this ruling overturned the precedent established by Chevron, it does not undermine previous cases that rely on the Chevron framework. Conclusions of those cases – affirming the legality of specific agency actions, including Chevron’s own interpretation of the Clean Air Act – remain intact under the doctrine of statutory stare decisis, despite the Court’s shift in their interpretive approach.
This change in the way judicial review is conducted is anticipated to initiate a new phase characterized by closer scrutiny of agency actions and potentially a different legislative approach by Congress.
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